





Abstract: Representationalism is, roughly, the view that experiencing is to be
analyzed wholly in terms of representing. But what sorts of properties are
represented in experience? According to a prominent form of representation-
alism, objective representationalism, experiences represent only objective (i.e.
suitably mind-independent) properties. I explore subjective representational-
ism, the view that experiences represent at least some subjective (i.e. suitably
mind-dependent) properties. Subjective representationalists, but not objective
representationalists, can accommodate cases of illusion-free phenomenal
inversion. Moreover, subjective representationalism captures the so-called
transparency of experience, as it is standardly articulated, just as well as objec-
tive representationalism.
The core idea of representationalism is that experiencing is to be analyzed
wholly in terms of representing. More precisely, representationalism is the
view that a mental state is an experience in virtue of being an appropriate
type of representational state, perhaps in conjunction with playing a
certain functional role; experiences are phenomenally similar or different
wholly in virtue of having similar or different representational contents.1
A pressing question for representationalism, then, is just what goes into
these phenomenal contents that determine the phenomenal similarities and
differences among experiences. Contrast two sorts of properties. Objective
properties are robustly mind-independent in this sense: whether or not
something instantiates an objective property does not depend essentially
on whether or not that thing is appropriately related to the minds of
subjects. Meanwhile, subjective properties are mind-dependent in a related
sense: whether or not something instantiates a subjective property does
depend essentially on whether or not that thing is appropriately related to
the minds of subjects. The subject in question might exist at some time
other than when the subjective property is instantiated.2 An obvious ques-
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tion is whether the contents of experience concern only objective proper-
ties, or whether they concern at least some subjective properties.
To sharpen this question, let me introduce a bit of terminology. I stipu-
late that phenomenal properties are the properties (a) that we are appar-
ently directly aware of via introspection, and (b) which generate, in the
appropriate way, certain well-known philosophical puzzles about experi-
ence, such as the explanatory gap puzzle, the inverted spectrum puzzle, the
zombie puzzle, and the puzzle concerning what Mary didn’t know.3 I will
often speak of more or less specific phenomenal properties (more specific:
phenomenal redness; less specific: phenomenal color).
Objective representationalism is the view that all phenomenal properties
are objective properties. As objective representationalism is usually devel-
oped, phenomenal colors are simply colors, and these in turn are some-
thing like dispositions to reflect light, or perhaps the categorical grounds
of such dispositions. Objective representationalists say that phenomenal
sounds, phenomenal tastes, phenomenal smells, etc. are also all objective
properties of some sort.
An alternative view is subjective representationalism, which denies objec-
tive representationalism while affirming representationalism simpliciter.
The core subjective representationalist idea is that at least some phenom-
enal properties (like phenomenal colors, phenomenal sounds, phenomenal
tastes, etc.) are subjective properties.4 Subjective representationalism is not
the much stronger view that all phenomenal properties are subjective
properties, though it is compatible with this view.
Many prominent representationalists appear to be objective representa-
tionalists. It’s difficult to tell for sure, since few explicitly consider the
question. Still, when representationalists give examples of the sorts of
properties represented in experience, they typically list exclusively objec-
tive properties. For instance, according to Michael Tye:
The most fundamental level of representation in visual experience, then, consists in what is
represented in the array prior to any grouping. . . . for example, distance away, orientation,
determinate color, texture, whether a discontinuity in depth is present there, and so on (Tye,
1996, pp. 122–123).
These are all objective properties, at least as Tye construes them.
Texture is manifestly an objective property, and Tye holds that colors are
also objective properties.5 Properties like distance away, orientation, and
having such-and-such discontinuity in depth are also objective, though
relational. For whether or not something is such-and-such distance from
me, or oriented a certain way with respect to me, or whatever, does not
essentially depend on whether that thing bears a certain relation to my
mind. Rather, it depends on whether or not it bears a certain relation
to me.6
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Tye also discusses phenomenal properties associated with non-visual
experiences. He conjectures that the contents of such experiences may
concern properties like ‘pitch, tone, loudness, pungency, muskiness, sweet-
ness, saltiness, [and] sourness.’7 He makes much of the fact that such
experienced properties as sounds and smells are ‘publically accessible,’8
and makes a similar point about taste: ‘We taste things by tasting their
tastes. One and the same taste can be tasted by different people.’9 It is
possible for a subjective property to be publically accessible, but given
Tye’s objectivism about colors, it would be natural for him to embrace a
similar view about pitch, tone, loudness, etc. So these comments suggest,
though they don’t demonstrate, that Tye thinks of these phenomenal
properties as objective.
Alex Byrne pins down a thesis which he calls (CV) – roughly, the thesis
that experiences have representational content. He then says:
. . . if (CV) is supported by an inference to the best explanation of illusions, then one might
expect perceptual content to be relatively thin. Visual illusions, as the object of study in the
visual sciences, concern properties like shape, motion, colour, shading, orientation and the
like (Byrne, 2009, p. 449).
Byrne later endorses this approach, saying, ‘We may provisionally con-
clude that perceptual content is relatively thin.’10 (By saying that percep-
tual content is ‘relatively thin,’ Byrne means to exclude kind properties –
like the property of being a pine tree or being a lemon – from perceptual
content). Byrne never revises this provisional conclusion in that paper.11
Byrne holds that color is an objective property,12 and all of the other
properties he lists are manifestly objective.
Similarly, leading representationalist Fred Dretske says this:
. . . what (properties) one is [aware] of in having the [experience of seeing a pumpkin] are
color, shape, texture, distance, and movement . . . (Dretske, 1999, p. 112).
So far as I know, Dretske has not published a view about whether colors
are objective, but the other properties he lists certainly are.
And consider Christopher Hill, who analyzes experiencing in terms of
the representation of what he calls ‘A-properties’ – he uses this term more
or less as I have been using the term ‘phenomenal properties.’ Hill suggests
that the A-properties associated with visual experiences of size and shape
‘are the values that are obtained when certain computable functions are
applied to angular properties (together with various other quantities).’ Hill
elaborates:
(i) the functions are in effect constancy transformations, (ii) they each take a number of
arguments in addition to angular sizes and angular shapes, all of which are relevant to
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computing constancies, (iii) their values fall short of being genuine constancies, and (iv) their
values are A-sizes and A-shapes (Hill, 2009, p. 165).
Hill states that angular sizes are ‘defined with reference to the nodal point
of the lens of the observer’s eye’ and that angular shapes ‘can for present
purposes be identified with the set o all visual angles that are subtended
by pairs of points on the boundary of the object’s facing surface.’13 He
proceeds to generalize this account to all A-properties – that is, to all
phenomenal properties – not just to those phenomenal properties asso-
ciated with visual experiences of size and shape. All A-properties are
produced by constancy transformations, but fall short of being genuine
constancies.14
Hill’s proposal is a form of objective representationalism.15 For angular
sizes and shapes are objective properties in our sense: while they are
sensitive to the location of the observer, they are wholly mind-independent.
(Similarly, while the property being within a mile of a coffee table is sensitive
to the location of coffee tables, it is a wholly mind-independent property).
And any property that is a computable function of only mind-independent
properties will itself be a mind-independent property.
Indeed, Hill even considers the suggestion ‘that A-properties should be
seen as involving or depending constitutively on internal factors’ and
rejects this proposal as ‘largely unmotivated.’16 This remark rules out
neural properties and the like from serving as input to the computable
functions which constitute A-properties. Hill shows no sympathy for sub-
jective representationalism here.
So, among many representationalists, objective representationalism
seems to be orthodoxy. I underscore once more that none of the remarks
quoted above provide conclusive evidence that Tye, Byrne, Dretske, or
Hill are objective representationalists. The point is only that objective
representationalism is the most natural extension of their views.
My aim in this article is to provide reasons for preferring subjective
representationalism to objective representationalism. I’ll show that objec-
tive representationalism cannot accommodate the possibility of illusion-
free phenomenal inversion, while subjective representationalism can.
Moreover, the intuition that illusion-free phenomenal inversion is possible
is robust.
Additionally, a dominant motivation for objective representationalism
is its ability to accommodate the transparency phenomenon, which I’ll
describe below. But I will develop a particular version of subjective rep-
resentationalism that holds that at least some phenomenal properties have
the form appropriately causing mental state M in me. I will show that, not
only can this version of subjective representationalism accommodate the
transparency phenomenon, but that it can do so just as well as objective
representationalism.
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Here is a map of the terrain ahead. §1 describes one brand of subjective
representationalism and argues that it handles phenomenal color inversion
intuitions better than objective representationalism. §2 generalizes the
argument to other phenomenal properties. §3 shows that the transparency
motivation for objective representationalism equally motivates subjective
representationalism, and §4 rebuts a recent objection. Closing remarks
appear in §5.
1. Capturing spectrum inversion intuitions
My main goal in this section is to demonstrate one substantial advantage
of subjective representationalism over objective representationalism. We
have a robust intuition that there are possible cases of phenomenal inver-
sion without illusion. Objective representationalism plainly cannot accom-
modate such intuitions. Subjective representationalism can.
Here is a familiar phenomenal inversion case. Consider two subjects,
Jack and Jill, who are both looking at a ripe (red) bell pepper. What it’s
like for Jack to see tomatoes, cherries, and ripe bell peppers is (in a salient
respect) the same as what it’s like for Jill to see limes, frogs, and unripe bell
peppers; these experiences share a common phenomenal character. Simi-
larly, what it’s like for Jack to see unripe bell peppers is the same as what
it’s like for Jill to see ripe bell peppers; those experiences, too, share a
common phenomenal character. Call this the Color Inversion Case. This
case seems perfectly conceivable.
It also seems perfectly conceivable that Jack’s experience and Jill’s expe-
rience could be wholly veridical – that neither of them are misperceiving
this ripe red bell pepper. We can imagine that their experiences are normal
for them: for example, Jack’s experiences of things we call ‘red’ have
always been like Jill’s experiences of things we call ‘green,’ and vice versa.
Both use color terms standardly (they both call ripe bell peppers ‘red’ and
unripe ones ‘green’). Their sorting behavior is identical – they agree com-
pletely on which items go in which piles when asked to sort things by color.
Each of them even belongs to a species for which such experiences are
typical. Given these stipulations about the case, it seems arbitrary to say
that one of their experiences of the ripe red bell pepper is veridical and the
other falsidical (and perhaps even more counterintuitive to say that both
of their experiences must be falsidical).
While there is an extensive literature attempting to show that Jack’s
experience and Jill’s experience cannot both be veridical, it is safe to say
that none of these arguments have been found widely compelling; our
intuition that cases like the Color Inversion Case need not involve any
illusion is robust.17 The relevant intuition is not merely that Jack and Jill
both have correct beliefs, but also that their experiences are not falsidical.
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Objective representationalism, as it is ordinarily developed, is incom-
patible with the possibility of illusion-free spectrum inversion. Objective
representationalists analyze what it’s like to have color experiences in
terms of the properties that those experiences represent. Typically, objec-
tive representationalists say that the represented properties are simply
colors, and that these in turn are either (roughly) dispositions to reflect
light or the categorical grounds of such dispositions.18 So when Jack and
Jill have different experiences while looking at a ripe bell pepper, Jack
represents the bell pepper as having the color property phenomenal F-ness,
and Jill represents it as having the color property phenomenal G-ness.
But perhaps the bell pepper can instantiate both color properties, so that
Jack’s experience and Jill’s experience are both veridical? Unfortunately
not. For it’s very plausible (and objective representationalists normally
accept) that the phenomenal property associated with Jack’s experience of
ripe bell peppers (phenomenal F-ness) is incompatible with the phenom-
enal property associated with his experience of unripe bell peppers (phe-
nomenal G-ness). These properties are incompatible in this sense: nothing
can wholly instantiate both phenomenal F-ness and phenomenal G-ness at
a given time. So if the bell pepper wholly instantiates any phenomenal
color property, then it can instantiate at most one of the two incompatible
properties attributed to it by Jack’s and Jill’s experiences.
The problem is generated by the following commitments of the objective
representationalist concerning the Color Inversion Case19:
(1) No object can wholly instantiate phenomenal F-ness and phenom-
enal G-ness at a given time.
(2) Jack’s experience of the ripe bell pepper represents something as
wholly instantiating phenomenal F-ness, and Jill’s experience of
the ripe bell pepper represents something as wholly instantiating
phenomenal G-ness.
(3) Jack’s experience and Jill’s experience attribute these respective
properties to the same thing at the same time.
(1) is common ground to almost all theories of experience. The phenom-
enal property paradigmatically associated with my experiences of red
things seems deeply incompatible with the phenomenal property paradig-
matically associated with my experiences of green things. It seems unin-
telligible that they could be co-instantiated.20
As for (2), we stipulated that Jack and Jill have different experiences in
the Color Inversion Case. Since objective representationalists analyze dif-
ferences in experience via differences in objective properties represented,
they must accept something like (2).
Usually, objective representationalism is motivated partly via the trans-
parency consideration (more on this in §2). For now, we can simply note
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that the usual form of objective representationalism says that phenomenal
color properties are represented as being instantiated in ordinary environ-
mental objects (like bell peppers). So objective representationalists nor-
mally accept (3).
It follows from (2) and (3) that Jack’s experience represents an object as
wholly phenomenally F, and Jill’s experience represents the same object as
wholly phenomenally G. But (1) says that no object can be both wholly
phenomenally F and wholly phenomenally G. So Jack’s experience and
Jill’s experience cannot both be veridical. Since the (canonical) objective
representationalist is committed to (1)–(3), she must deny that Jack’s
experience and Jill’s experience are both veridical in the Inversion Case.
The point readily generalizes: objective representationalism cannot coun-
tenance illusion-free color inversion.
Can subjective representationalism do better? At first glance, it appears
not. Everyone, subjective representationalists included, should accept (1).
And any representationalist, objective or not, must accept something like
(2). For Jack and Jill have phenomenally different experiences, and rep-
resentationalists are committed to understanding such differences in terms
of representational differences. Finally, subjective representationalists
(just like objective representationalists) can deny (3) by denying the trans-
parency consideration. But this is a compelling datum, and I’d like to see
whether we can keep it.
Egan (2006) provides a neat solution to the problem. The solution is
motivated in part by the point that, to understand the contents of certain
propositional attitudes, we need more fine-grained objects than possible
worlds.21 The following example illustrates why possible-worlds content
isn’t fine-grained enough. Suppose that from noon to midnight I am
sitting on the bus to Chicago, with my eyes closed the entire time. Some-
time in the middle of the trip, I wonder what time it is now. No matter
how much information I acquire about which possible world is actual,
this alone will not tell me what time it is now. To learn this, I must learn
something about – to put things intuitively – where I am located in the
world.
A natural thought is to introduce centered possible worlds. There are
many ways of understanding what these are, but I’ll take a centered
possible world to be a world with a ‘marked’ individual and time. So here
is a centered possible world: <the actual world, Barack Obama, December
1 2010>. Propositional attitudes may be assigned centered possible world
contents. Since centered possible world contents are strictly more fine-
grained than possible world contents, we don’t lose any modeling capa-
bilities when we switch to them. But we do gain some powerful new
modeling capabilities. For example, we can now say what I’m wondering
when I wonder what time it is now. I’m not wondering which world is
actual, but rather which temporal location I’m in now.
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Possible worlds contents determine functions from possible worlds to
truth values. By contrast, centered possible worlds contents determine
functions from centered possible worlds to truth values. If we are modeling
contents with ordinary possible worlds, then any two actual individuals
who represent incompatibly can’t both be correct. If I believe that p and
you believe that not p, we can’t both be right. But introducing centered
possible worlds permits for cases in which two actual individuals represent
incompatibly, and both are correct.
To see this, suppose that at time t Sammy is in Chicago and Sally is in
New York. And, at time t, it’s raining in Chicago but not in New York.
Sammy thinks the thought he would express by saying, ‘It’s raining
here,’ and Sally thinks the thought she would express by saying, ‘It’s not
raining here’; these thoughts have quite different truth conditions. The
truth of Sammy’s thought requires that it be raining in some salient
location in Chicago, while the truth of Sally’s thought requires that it be
raining in some salient location in New York. Still, both think something
true.
Still, there is an important intuitive sense in which Sammy’s thought and
Sally’s thought represent incompatibly, even though both of them think
true thoughts. The centered worlds theorist can capture this sense of
representational incompatibility by saying that Sammy’s thought and
Sally’s thought have incompatible centered contents: one has the content
that it is raining in some salient location near the marked center, and the
other has the content that it is not raining in some salient location near the
marked center. Assessed at the actual world centered on Sammy at t, only
the former content is true. Assessed at the actual world centered on Sally
at t, only the latter content is true.
Let’s define an ordinary function as a function from possible worlds to
extensions. Standardly, it is thought that any property (like being a dog or
being red) determines an ordinary function. The property being a dog, for
example, determines the function that takes as input any possible world
and delivers as output every dog in that world. The possible worlds theo-
rist will likely model predicates (like ‘is a dog’) in terms of ordinary
functions.
But now consider centered functions, which are functions from centered
possible worlds to extensions. The centered possible worlds theorist can
model predicates (like ‘is a dog’ or ‘is now red’ or ‘is near me’) in terms of
centered functions instead of ordinary functions.
There is a centered function corresponding to every ordinary function,
since, for every function from possible worlds to extensions, there is a
corresponding function from centered possible worlds to extensions.
(Intuitively, these are functions from centered possible worlds to exten-
sions that ignore the marked center). So any theoretical work done by
ordinary functions can also be done by centered functions.
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But there are also centered functions corresponding to no ordinary
functions. (Intuitively, these are functions from centered possible worlds
to extensions that do not ignore the marked center). So there may be
theoretical work that centered functions can do and ordinary functions
cannot do.
As I said, properties are normally thought of as determining ordinary
functions. But, from here on out, I’ll instead talk as though properties
determine centered functions. (This use of the term ‘property’ is non-
standard, but it is a natural extension of the standard use). This lets us
distinguish between ordinary properties and centered properties. An ordi-
nary property is a property that determines a centered function corre-
sponding to an ordinary function, while a centered property is a property
that determines a centered function corresponding to no ordinary func-
tion. (Thus every property is either ordinary or centered, and no property
is both).
Some examples will help. The property of being a dog is ordinary; it
determines a centered function from any centered possible world to the
dogs in that world. (The function ignores any information about the
marked centers of these worlds, so it corresponds to an ordinary function).
Meanwhile, the property being me is centered; it determines a centered
function from any centered possible world to the individual marked at the
center of that world. There is no ordinary function corresponding to this
centered function, since the centered function puts to use information
about the marked centers of these worlds.
Notice that centered properties are not instantiated (or uninstantiated)
simpliciter in the actual world, or in any other possible world; they are
instantiated (or uninstantiated) only relative to a center in the actual
world, or relative to a centered possible world. (Analogy: we cannot
evaluate the thought that New York is here simpliciter, but only given a
context).
The pivotal suggestion of Egan (2006) is that the subjective representa-
tionalist can exploit centered properties to explain what’s going on in the
Inversion Case. The thought is that Jack’s experience and Jill’s experience
represent things as being the same way – they have the same centered
worlds content, ascribing the same properties – even though the veridical-
ity conditions of their experiences differ given their different locations in
the world. Here ends my recapitulation of Egan (2006); I’ll spell out my
preferred version of the view below.
I should mention that, while some have used the label ‘subjective’ to
describe content modeled in terms of centered possible worlds, that is not
how I’m using the term in this article. I’ll speak of ‘de se content’ to
describe content modeled in terms of centered possible worlds.
Pressing forward: what property do both Jack and Jill ascribe to the ripe
bell pepper? Let’s start with a simple subjective representationalist pro-
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posal according to which phenomenal color properties are centered prop-
erties of the form causing mental state M in me (where ‘me’ picks out the
marked individual of the centered world).
What kind of mental state is M? Shoemaker (2003 and elsewhere) sug-
gests that M is the very experience whose content is in question.22 Given
our simple proposal about phenomenal color properties, this amounts to
the claim that the content of a color experience E involves the centered
property causing E in me. As an anonymous referee has noted (and as
Shoemaker himself recognizes), such proposals make it impossible to indi-
viduate a color experience wholly in terms of its content. For this content
would refer to the experience to be individuated, and would thus be
circular. So representationalists should construe M as some mental state
other than the experience whose content is in question.23
Aside from this requirement, subjective representationalists can reason-
ably disagree about what kind of state M is. I prefer the view that M is the
mental state that, in the causal chain of mental states leading up to the
experience, is immediately prior to the experience. (This will likely be some
subpersonal perceptual state). But the central arguments of this article do
not turn on this specific proposal.
Back to the view that phenomenal color properties are centered prop-
erties of the form causing mental state M in me. On this view, phenomenal
redness is the centered property of causing some specific type of mental
state – call it Mred – in the marked individual at some centered world. There
is something it’s like for me to experience phenomenal redness, and what
it’s like is to be explained wholly in terms of the fact that my experience of
phenomenal redness represents something as causing a mental state of
type Mred in me.
An immediate objection to this view is that, when I introspect on my
experiences involving phenomenal redness, I don’t seem to be aware of a
complex property, at least not of the sort causing mental state Mred in me.
I can’t introspectively separate a causal element when I consider my expe-
rience of phenomenal redness.24
The objection is defused by noting that our experiences need not repre-
sent this complex property – causing mental state M in me – as a complex
property. Experience may represent the property while misrepresenting it
as simple.25 Alternatively, experience may represent the property while
remaining silent on whether it is simple or complex. Introspection alone
doesn’t refute the view that phenomenal properties have such hidden
complexity. Moreover, even though phenomenal content is introspectively
accessible, not all facts about phenomenal content need be introspectively
accessible.26
In any case, the most dialectically relevant point is that the same prob-
lems afflict objective representationalism. Objective representationalists
typically say that phenomenal colors are enormously complicated dispo-
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sitional properties, but phenomenal colors certainly don’t seem to be
enormously complicated dispositional properties when I introspect them.
So worries of this kind give objective representationalism no edge over
subjective representationalism.
Here is a better objection. Consider the state of affairs obtaining at the
moment of the Big Bang, which presumably caused everything after-
wards.27 Specifically, that state of affairs has caused every mental state I’ve
ever undergone. So the Big Bang instantiates every phenomenal color
property that I’ve ever experienced (relative to me now).28
This is counterintuitive on two counts. First, it’s just implausible that
the Big Bang really does instantiate all of those phenomenal colors relative
to me now. Second, and more seriously, the instantiation of certain phe-
nomenal colors excludes the instantiation of other phenomenal colors. For
instance, nothing can be both phenomenally red and phenomenally green
(at the same time and place, relative to the same center). But, on the view
we’re considering, the Big Bang instantiates these and many more incom-
patible phenomenal colors relative to me now.
To deal with such problems, we can try restricting the causal relation in
question. To be phenomenally red, we might say, a thing must do more
than simply cause an Mred-state in me in any way at all. A thing must
further stand in the kind of causal relation to my Mred-state that is typical
of cases of veridical perception. The idea is that, when I successfully
perceive a red mango, the mango causes an Mred-state in me in a particular
way. I’ll abbreviate this by saying that the thing must appropriately cause
the Mred-state. The new proposal – and the one I will explore in the rest of
this article – is that phenomenal colors are centered properties of the form
appropriately causing mental state M in me.
Appropriate causation is incompatible with all kinds of ‘deviant’ causal
chains. It is also incompatible with causal chains that are, to phrase the
idea intuitively, ‘too long’ or ‘too short.’ When I successfully perceive the
mango, both the Big Bang and a certain state of my retina are causally
implicated in the production of the Mred-state. But neither causes the
Mred-state in the appropriate way, so, on the present proposal, neither is
phenomenally red.
We now have the resources to handle the Inversion Case without imput-
ing misrepresentation. When Jack looks at a ripe bell pepper and Jill looks
at an unripe bell pepper, their experiences both ascribe the following
property to the entire surface of the respective bell peppers: appropriately
causing mental state M1 in me. What it’s like to have an experience quite
generally is determined by the content of that experience – in this case, by
what properties it ascribes.29 Since Jack’s experience and Jill’s experience
ascribe the same property, their experiences are phenomenally the same (at
least with respect to phenomenal color). Moreover, the ripe bell pepper
does appropriately cause M1 in Jack, and the unripe bell pepper also
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appropriately causes M1 in Jill. So both of their experiences are veridical in
this respect.
In what sense, then, is phenomenal redness incompatible with phenom-
enal greenness? I remarked above that objects instantiate ordinary prop-
erties simpliciter, but objects do not instantiate centered properties
simpliciter. Rather, objects instantiate centered properties relative to a
marked center (a marked individual and time). So the idea is that no object
can wholly instantiate phenomenal redness relative to a subject at a time
and wholly instantiate phenomenal greenness relative to the same subject
and time. But an object can wholly instantiate phenomenal redness relative
to a given subject at a given time and wholly instantiate phenomenal
greenness relative to another subject at that time (or relative to the same
subject at another time). That is the sense in which phenomenal redness
and phenomenal greenness are incompatible properties.
One might worry that talk of properties being instantiated ‘relative to a
marked center’ is incoherent, or at least that it is bad metaphysical
manners to speak this way. I offer three responses to this worry. First, we
can easily pick out centered properties using perfectly acceptable notions:
a centered property determines a function from any possible world with a
marked individual and time to a set of objects. This way of talking doesn’t
lead to any obvious technical problems. So we have a way of translating
centered-property talk into perfectly respectable talk. Second, as I empha-
sized earlier, we seem to need centered properties to deal with lots of
propositional-attitude contents.
Finally, and most relevantly for present purposes, centered properties
permit us to capture two deep but apparently incompatible intuitions.
Consider again the case where Jack and Jill are both looking at the same
ripe bell pepper and having experiences that differ with respect to phe-
nomenal color. Intuitively, both of their experiences are veridical with
respect to phenomenal color. But, intuitively, the properties that they
ascribe to the bell pepper seem to be incompatible in some important
sense.
Surprisingly, our current proposal reconciles these intuitions. Jack cor-
rectly ascribes to the bell pepper the property appropriately causing mental
state M1 in me, and Jill correctly ascribes to the bell pepper the property
appropriately causing mental state M2 in me. So both of their experiences
are veridical with respect to phenomenal colors.
At the same time, Jack could not correctly ascribe to the bell pepper
both the property appropriately causing mental state M1 in me and the
property appropriately causing mental state M2 in me. For, plausibly, no
patch of the bell pepper’s surface could appropriately cause both mental
state M1 and mental state M2 in a given subject at a given time. So these
two phenomenal colors are incompatible in an important sense: they
cannot both be wholly instantiated in anything at a given time, relative to
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a given subject. So subjective representationalism can accommodate the
whole raft of intuitions about the Color Inversion Case.30
It is instructive to see how this subjective representationalist account
applies to the following case, raised by an anonymous referee. Suppose
that a creature, Deviant, mutates from a normal perceiver to an inverted
perceiver. Deviant is just as well adapted to its environment as its normal
conspecifics – indeed, it may be behaviorally indistinguishable from them.
The subjective representationalist account I’ve been selling says that
Deviant misrepresents, for its experiences are not appropriately caused by
environmental objects. But suppose that Deviant leaves lots of inverted
offspring who are behaviorally indistinguishable from Deviant in the rel-
evant ways. After enough generations pass, it seems that there will be
inverted offspring whose experiences are appropriately caused by environ-
mental objects and thus count as veridically representing. Isn’t this
arbitrary?
I think not. For it is a spectacular accident that Deviant has the relevant
adaptive behavioral dispositions – Deviant was very lucky to have gotten
the precise mutations that made it behave like a normal perceiver of its
kind. By contrast, it is no accident that Deviant’s offspring many genera-
tions later have these adaptive behavioral dispositions. Had their ances-
tors lacked such adaptive behavioral dispositions, those ancestors would
have been much less likely to reproduce and pass on the mutation resulting
in inverted perceptual states. So there is a principled explanation for why
Deviant’s offspring have veridical experiences, while Deviant does not.
One might wonder whether objective representationalism can also
accommodate our intuitions about the Color Inversion Case by appealing
to centered properties instead of ordinary properties. For just as there are
both objective and subjective ordinary properties, there are both objective
and subjective centered properties. The centered property ‘being far away’
is an example of an objective centered property. The sun instantiates this
property relative to the earth now, and its instantiation of this property
does not depend essentially on its relation to the minds of any subjects.
But even if objective representationalists make use of centered proper-
ties, they cannot accommodate our intuitions about illusion-free color
inversion. We have the robust intuition that when Jack and Jill both look
at the same ripe bell pepper and have different experiences with respect
to phenomenal color, both experiences may be veridical. The intuition
remains even if the bell pepper has all the same objective centered prop-
erties (or near enough) ‘for Jack’ and ‘for Jill.’ Jack and Jill might be
standing right next to each other at the same time; though their eyes can’t
literally be in the same place, there need not be any relevant difference
between their positions.
So the objective centered properties of the bell pepper are the same
whether we take Jack at noon or Jill at noon as the marked center. The only
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properties of the bell pepper that differ ‘relative to Jack at noon’ and
‘relative to Jill at noon’ are mental: Jack and Jill are in different mental
states. So the introduction of centered properties does not help the objec-
tive representationalist here.
This subjective representationalist proposal characterizes only phenom-
enal colors, not colors simpliciter. One may further hold either that colors
simpliciter are phenomenal colors, or that they are not. The subjective
representationalist who takes the latter approach may hold that colors
themselves are either objective or subjective properties.
As Billy Dunaway pointed out to me, the introduction of indexical
content is what does the heavy lifting in this account. But there are lots of
ways of analyzing indexical contents: via de se content (as I do), via
Kaplanian characters (see Kaplan, 1989a and 1989b), via Fregean senses,
etc. So why do I discuss only the de se analysis?
For two reasons. First, as Brogaard (2010) emphasizes, there are several
other potential further uses of de se content in understanding experience.
Second, and more importantly, it seems to me that this is the only
approach compatible with the determinacy of experience. I return to this
issue in a footnote in §4.
In sum, subjective representationalism that invokes de se contents with
centered properties of the form appropriately causing mental state M in me
can accommodate a set of robust but apparently incompatible intuitions
about phenomenal color inversions. Objective representationalism can’t
do this, with or without centered properties. This is a substantial advan-
tage of subjective representationalism over objective representationalism,
at least in explaining color experiences. In the next section, I examine
whether the argument extends to phenomenal properties besides phenom-
enal colors.
2. Extending the argument
The argument extends to any phenomenal determinable of type Q with
determinates Q1 . . . Qn, such that we can coherently conceive of an
illusion-free inversion case meeting these conditions:
(1*) Nothing can wholly instantiate Q1 and Q2 at a given time.
(2*) Jack’s experience represents Q1, and Jill’s experience represents Q2.
(3*) Jack’s experience and Jill’s experience attribute these respective
properties to the same thing at the same time.
In this section, I’ll attempt to generalize the argument. It’s plausible that
there are cases of illusion-free sound inversion, taste inversion, touch
inversion, smell inversion, bodily sensation inversion, etc., that meet these
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conditions. If there are such cases, then the argument generalizes to phe-
nomenal sounds, tastes, touches, smells, bodily sensations, etc.
Here is a situation much like the Color Inversion Case, but involving
phenomenal sounds; call it the Sound Inversion Case. Suppose Jack and Jill
both hear a loud sound but have different experiences. For, in general, the
experiences Jack has when he hears loud sounds are just like the experi-
ences Jill has when she hears quiet sounds, and vice versa. These experi-
ences are typical for them, and Jack and Jill are behaviorally alike. For
example, they call the same sounds ‘loud’ and ‘quiet,’ and respond alike
when asked to sort sounds by how loud they are.31
According to the representationalist, Jack’s experience of a particular
loud sound and Jill’s experience of the corresponding quiet sound have the
same phenomenal character because they both represent the same phe-
nomenal property – call it phenomenal loudness. Similarly, Jack’s experi-
ence of a particular quiet sound and Jill’s experience of the corresponding
loud sound have the same phenomenal character because they both rep-
resent another phenomenal property – call it phenomenal quietness. It
seems perfectly conceivable that both of their experiences are wholly
veridical.
The Sound Inversion Case meets conditions (1*), (2*), and (3*), but
there are some nuances in seeing how. For (1*) to be satisfied, there must
be two phenomenal properties Q1 and Q2 such that nothing can wholly
instantiate Q1 and Q2 at a given time. The natural proposal is that Q1 and
Q2 are phenomenal loudness and phenomenal quietness, respectively. But
one might worry that something can instantiate both of these properties at
a given time. For suppose I hear a sound created by a loud guitar and a
quiet piano. Plausibly, something (perhaps my experience, or a body of
air, or whatever) then instantiates both phenomenal loudness and phe-
nomenal quietness in such a case.
This isn’t problematic. While it might be that a single thing instantiates
both phenomenal loudness and phenomenal quietness in the Sound
Inversion Case, nothing wholly instantiates both of these properties. Part
of the object – here I’m using the term ‘object’ very permissively – instan-
tiates phenomenal loudness, and part of it instantiates phenomenal qui-
etness. I can readily swap my attention between these parts and the whole
object. But I cannot attend to anything that wholly instantiates both
properties.
The representationalist must also accept this version of (2*): Jack’s
experience represents phenomenal loudness, and Jill’s experience repre-
sents phenomenal quietness. Representationalists analyze similarities and
difference in what-it’s-like to have any experiences in terms of similarities
and differences in the representational contents of those experiences. So
they must analyze the differences in Jack’s and Jill’s experiences via a
difference in the representational contents of their experiences, and talk of
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‘phenomenal loudness’ and ‘phenomenal quietness’ is merely a convenient
way of labeling the relevant phenomenal properties figuring in these dif-
ferent contents.
Finally, representationalists sympathetic to transparency considera-
tions, to be discussed in the next section, must accept (3*): Jack’s experi-
ence and Jill’s experience attribute these respective properties to the same
thing at the same time. Transparency theorists, as we shall see, think that
phenomenal sounds are features of objects outside the subject. And we
may build into the Sound Inversion Case that Jack and Jill are appropri-
ately related to the same environmental objects, or at least environmental
objects of the same type. (Again, ‘object’ is being used loosely, so that
bodies of air count as objects).
Since we have an illusion-free inversion case that satisfies (1*), (2*), and
(3*), the arguments of §1 apply directly. As before, I propose that we
analyze properties like being phenomenally loud as properties of the form
appropriately causing mental state M in me.
The argument extends readily to phenomenal properties associated with
all perceptual experiences. For example, it applies to phenomenal tastes
(like phenomenal sourness and phenomenal sweetness), phenomenal
touches (like phenomenal softness and phenomenal hardness), and phe-
nomenal smells (like phenomenal vanilla-scentedness and phenomenal
cinnamon-scentedness). It also applies to hedonic experiences (like phe-
nomenal burning-pains and phenomenal freezing-pains) and bodily sen-
sation experiences (like phenomenal stillness and phenomenal dizziness).
Running through the above considerations in each case would be tedious
and unnecessary. It is clear how the arguments would go.
As in the previous section, this argument characterizes only certain
phenomenal properties. It is silent about the nature of sweetness simpliciter,
softness simpliciter, vanilla-scentedness simpliciter, etc.
Are there any phenomenal properties that escape the net of this argu-
ment? Perhaps phenomenal properties associated with experiences of
space do, like the phenomenal property associated with my seeing some-
thing as circular or far away. Thompson (2010) provides extensive argu-
ments that illusion-free inversion of even these properties is possible. If
Thompson’s arguments succeed, then my argument extends to them, too.
Another candidate for phenomenal properties that elude this style of
argument are those phenomenal properties, if there are any, associated
with the ‘phenomenology of intentionality.’32 It is very contentious
whether there are such phenomenal properties. Indeed, the arguments here
may bear on the question of whether there is a distinctive phenomenology
of intentionality. If all uncontroversial examples of phenomenal properties
are susceptible to illusion-free inversion, then that provides at least some
reason for thinking that a property which resists such inversion is not
really a phenomenal property. I won’t explore this line of reasoning
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further. It’s fine by me if there are some objective phenomenal properties,
since subjective representationalism says merely that some phenomenal
properties are subjective.
3. Transparency and representationalism
Perhaps the most commonly cited consideration in favor of objective
representationalism is the transparency consideration. Objective represen-
tationalists don’t agree on exactly how to formulate this consideration, but
their formulations do have much in common. I will argue that subjective
representationalism can account for the transparency phenomenon at least
as well as objective representationalism does, however that phenomenon is
best articulated.
I will focus on Gilbert Harman’s and Michael Tye’s articulations of
transparency. I select Harman, 1990 because it is the most cited recent
discussion of transparency; I select Tye, 2002 because it is an especially
thorough elaboration of how the transparency intuition supports objective
representationalism.
Here is the pivotal passage from Harman’s seminal discussion:
Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic properties of your visual expe-
rience. I predict that you will find that the only properties there to turn your attention to
will be properties of the tree, including relational properties of the tree ‘from here’ (1990,
p. 39).
It’s worth highlighting that Harman does not hesitate to talk about the
‘relational properties of the tree.’ The transparency consideration, what-
ever it is, is not a consideration about whether experience presents us
with relational or non-relational features.
To follow Harman’s instruction to try to turn one’s attention to intrinsic
properties of one’s visual experience, I assume that we employ introspec-
tion. Harman makes both (i) the negative claim that introspection turns up
no intrinsic properties of visual experience, and (ii) the positive claim that
introspection turns up properties of the tree.
But what is the general type of object whose properties we can intro-
spectively attend to? Is it the class of external objects, environmental
objects, non-mental objects, or what? Harman’s discussion is none too clear
on this point.
Now consider Tye’s remarks. Here are some representative passages:
Whatever the nature of the qualities of which we are directly aware when we focus upon how
the surfaces before us look, these qualities are not experienced as qualities of our experiences
but rather as qualities of the surfaces (Tye, 2002, p. 138).
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When you introspect your visual experience, the only particulars of which you are aware are
the external ones making up the scene before your eyes. You are not aware of those objects
and a further inner object or episode (ibid., p. 139).
Like Harman, Tye makes both a negative claim and a positive one. Tye’s
negative claim is that attending to how things look via introspection does
not seem to turn up anything inner – it reveals no experiences, inner
objects, or inner episodes. Tye’s positive claim is that it does turn up
(apparent) qualities of external things, like surfaces.
The common phenomenological point that we can extract from Harman
and Tye is this: introspection seems to reveal only properties of certain
kinds of outer stuff – perhaps external or environmental or intentional
objects. It does not seem to reveal properties of inner stuff, like the expe-
rience itself. I’m using the term ‘stuff’ because of its pliability. Expanses of
sky, experiential events or processes, and ordinary objects all count as stuff
in my sense.
It is clear how this motivates objective representationalism. Unless
introspection is massively unreliable – which we may reasonably think
it’s not – these introspected phenomenal properties (like phenomenal
colors) are properties of outer stuff, not inner stuff. This is just what
objective representationalism says. According to a common version of
objective representationalism, phenomenal colors are something like dis-
positions to reflect light, or the categorical grounds of those dispositions.
Outer stuff – like apples, expanses of sky, pitchers of beer, and so on –
instantiates such properties. (Inner stuff does too, but presumably we’re
not normally aware of those properties). The objective representational-
ist may hold that other phenomenal properties are also objective prop-
erties of outer stuff.
Many kinds of experiences are allegedly problematic for the transpar-
ency argument, including (to select only a few examples) experiences asso-
ciated with blurry vision or double vision, experiences involving size and
shape constancy, and experiences associated with bodily sensations.33 I set
aside such objections for four reasons.
First, I am tentatively sympathetic to the idea that such examples do not
really pose problems for the transparency thesis. Second, this article is
largely aimed at those sympathetic to objective representationalism. Since
many such sympathizers accept a suitable transparency thesis, my argu-
ment will be dialectically effective for them.
Third, in Mehta, ms. A, I have defended a separate argument (based on
the spatial character of experience) that arrives at the same conclusion as
the transparency argument – the conclusion that, if experience is veridical,
phenomenal properties are properties of outer stuff. But this argument, I
claim, is not vulnerable to the kinds of objections that have been raised for
transparency theses like those defended by Harman and Tye.
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My fourth comment is for those unsympathetic to the conclusion of the
transparency argument. One can easily develop a version of subjective
representationalism according to which many or all phenomenal proper-
ties represented by experience are properties of inner stuff. So even if
transparency enthusiasts are getting the phenomenology wrong, subjective
representationalism more broadly wouldn’t be in trouble, though the spe-
cific subjective representationalist proposal I’ve sketched here would then
lose an important source of support.
Setting aside worries about whether experience is transparent, then, here
is the payoff. At best, transparency considerations support only a conclu-
sion about where the stuff that instantiates (e.g.) phenomenal colors is
located: it’s located outside the subject. (That is, as long as the experience
is veridical and the subject isn’t experiencing her insides). These transpar-
ency considerations do not support any conclusion about exactly which
properties of outer stuff are relevant.
To be sure, this does cut against lots of views about experience. But it
does not cut against the form of subjective representationalism sketched
above, according to which some phenomenal properties have the form
appropriately causing mental state M in me. These properties may be
instantiated outside the subject. Indeed, the subjective representationalist
who wishes to capture strong transparency theses of the sort articulated by
Harman and Tye may say that all phenomenal properties that we experi-
ence are instantiated in outer stuff, not inner stuff.
Still, one might worry that representationalist views that invoke de se
content – content that invokes centered possible worlds – face special
worries. In the next section, I consider one such worry.
4. Determinacy and centered content
Color experience seems to present objects as being a certain specific way.
When I see a red strawberry and experience phenomenal redness, my
experience presents the strawberry as being a highly determinate way –
phenomenally red. Call this the determinacy phenomenon. (The determi-
nacy phenomenon might or might not be related to the transparency
phenomenon).
Thompson (2007, fn. 28) worries that de se involving cannot concern
any specific way things are, and thus can’t accommodate the determinacy
phenomenon. In this section, I’ll try to develop the worry (since Thomp-
son mentions it only in a footnote) and then relieve it.
Before elaborating on the worry, I should separate it from a different
worry. One might worry that paradigmatic phenomenal properties seem to
be intrinsic rather than (as subjective representationalism has it) relational.
This worry applies to any form of subjective representationalism, whether
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or not the view posits de se contents. I’m not dealing with this worry here,
for others have replied to it persuasively.34 The worry I’m engaging applies
specifically to views that individuate experiences via something like de se
content.
An example might help bring out the worry. If I believe that Chicago is
west of New York, there is a specific way I take things to be: I take things
to be such that Chicago is west of New York. But if I believe that Chicago
is west of here, it seems that there is not a specific way I take things to be,
for I needn’t have any view about where I am. In the latter case, one might
think, my belief places some constraints on how I take things to be, but it
doesn’t concern a specific way that I take things to be. The worry, stated
more generally, is that de se content cannot specify how things are; it can
only place constraints on specifications of how things are.
To show that this worry is misguided, let’s look more carefully at
propositional attitudes whose contents do not essentially involve centered
properties – say, my belief that Chicago is west of New York. This belief
plainly concerns how Chicago is specifically. Why is that? What does this
specificity amount to?
Well, on one approach, the content of my belief that Chicago is west of
New York corresponds to a set of possible worlds. If my belief is correct,
then I can’t be in certain possible worlds: I can’t be in those possible worlds
in which Chicago isn’t west of New York. It would be natural for advo-
cates of this approach to say that my belief concerns how Chicago is
specifically because it rules out specific possibilities concerning Chicago.
On another approach, the content of my belief that Chicago is west of
New York involves a structured Russellian proposition containing
Chicago itself and the ordinary property being west of New York.35 Advo-
cates of this view also have a natural account of why my belief concerns
specifically how Chicago is: it attributes the specific ordinary property
being west of New York to Chicago.
But de se content is deeply analogous to ordinary content. Consider
again my belief that Chicago is west of here. We can model the de se
content of my belief with a set of centered possible worlds – possible
worlds with a marked individual and time. If my belief is correct, then I
can’t be in certain marked locations within possible worlds: I can’t be in
any location in a possible world in which Chicago isn’t west of that
location in that world. In other words, when I believe that Chicago is west
of here, I do take things to be a specific way. I take myself to be in a certain
type of location within a possible world: one in which Chicago is to the
west of me now.
Alternatively, we can model the de se content of this belief with a
structured Russellian proposition containing Chicago itself and the cen-
tered property being west of here. While this centered property doesn’t
determine an extension given a possible world alone, it does determine an
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extension given a centered possible world. So, as before, it’s natural to say
that my belief concerns specifically how Chicago is. For my belief
attributes the specific centered property being west of here to Chicago.
Now for the payoff: the same point applies to de se contents that involve
properties like appropriately causing Mred in me. Suppose my experience of
phenomenal redness involves such a de se content. This content cannot be
understood just in terms of which worlds it rules out; nor can it be
understood just in terms of which properties it attributes. Nevertheless, it
can be understood just in terms of which centered worlds it rules out;
alternatively, it can be understood just in terms of which centered prop-
erties it attributes.
Understood either way, the content of such an experience does concern
how things are specifically. In our example, my experience presents some-
thing as appropriately causing Mred in me. This centered content concerns
a specific feature of the object represented in a way tightly analogous to the
way that the content featuring the property appropriately causing Mred in S
at time t concerns a specific feature. Thus, there is no special worry here for
subjective representationalism.
Put generally, my point is this. Consider a belief about an object, where
this belief has ordinary content featuring only ordinary properties. It
should be uncontroversial that such a belief can concern how, specifically,
that object is. But de se content is theoretically very much like ordinary
content; in this section and in §1, I’ve meticulously documented the deep
parallels between these two approaches to modeling content. Any reasons
for thinking that ordinary content can concern the specific features of
objects are equally reasons for thinking that de se content can concern the
specific features of objects.36
5. Conclusion
I’ve sketched a version of subjective representationalism that has a sub-
stantial advantage over objective representationalism: it can accommo-
date our deeply held intuitions about the possibility of illusion-free
phenomenal inversions. Moreover, I’ve argued that the transparency phe-
nomenon, arguably the single most powerful motivation for objective
representationalism, is just as powerful a motivation for this version of
subjective representationalism. Finally, I rebutted an objection based on
the determinacy of experience.
Still, my comparison of objective and subjective representationalism has
been sharply limited. There is much to explain about experience besides
our intuitions about phenomenal inversion cases, the transparency phe-
nomenon, and the determinacy phenomenon. Perhaps, at the end of the
day, objective representationalism will prove the superior theory. My hope
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is only that the arguments here provoke greater scrutiny of what strikes me
as a promising alternative to objective representationalism.37
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NOTES
1 This view is sometimes called ‘strong representationalism,’ as there are related but
substantially weaker views that go under the label ‘representationalism.’ For example, Byrne
(2001) argues that phenomenal character supervenes on representational properties, without
making the stronger claim that mental states have their phenomenal character in virtue of
having certain representational properties. As I will not be concerned with these weaker views
in this article, I’ll stick with the terminology in the text. Advocates of representationalism, as
I use the term, include Carruthers (2000) and (2005); Dretske (1995) and (2003); Harman
(1990); Hill (2009); Lycan (1996); Pautz (2010); and Tye (1995, 2000 and 2002). Tye (2009)
endorses a view very close to representationalism.
2 I admit that I’m not sure that this is quite the right way of drawing the objective/
subjective distinction. That said, it’s pretty clear that there is some important distinction of
this sort to be drawn, and no one knows quite how to draw it. The distinction I propose in
the text provides a good enough approximation for present purposes.
3 Influential presentations of these puzzles are offered, respectively, by Levine, 1983;
Shoemaker, 1982; Chalmers, 1996, pp. 93–171; and Jackson, 1982.
4 Sydney Shoemaker has explored many views in the vicinity of subjective representation-
alism (1994a, 1994b, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006). However, Shoemaker disavows reductivist
ambitions, so strictly speaking he does not qualify as a representationalist, as I’m using the
term.
5 For example, see Tye, 2000, Chapter 7.
6 I thank Brad Thompson for helpful discussion on this point.
7 Tye, 2000, p. 50.
8 Ibid., p. 49.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 450.
11 Strictly speaking, Byrne does not endorse representationalism (as I’ve defined it) in this
article, but only a weaker thesis – see Note 1. Still, his view is compatible with representa-
tionalism, and it’s notable that the contents he attributes to experiences involve exclusively
objective properties.
12 Byrne and Hilbert, 2003.
13 Ibid., p. 162.
14 Ibid., pp. 165–168.
15 Hill says several times that A-properties are not ‘objective,’ but it’s clear from context
that his use of the term differs from ours. Roughly, Hill uses the term to refer to something
like observer-independence, not mind-independence.
16 Ibid., p. 167.
17 For further defense of this point, see Chalmers, 2006; Shoemaker, 1982, 1994a, 1994b,
2000 and 2003; and Thompson, 2009.
18 See, for example, Byrne, 2001 and 2006; Byrne and Hilbert, 2003; and Tye, 1995 and
2000.
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19 Roughly this problem is also noted in Chalmers, 2006; Egan, 2006; and Thompson,
2007.
20 But cf. Harman, 2001 for a contrary opinion.
21 For compelling arguments that we need something more fine-grained than possible
worlds to understand content, see Perry, 1979 and Lewis, 1979. But note that Perry does not
endorse a centered-contents approach to explaining the relevant phenomena.
22 Though on his account involves a more complex property than causing M in me.
23 Recall that Shoemaker is not a representationalist in my strong sense of this term – see
Note 1.
24 An anonymous referee pointed out this related objection: if the present proposal is
correct, introspection can immediately reveal that there is mind-body causation. But surely
introspection cannot do that. The upcoming reply handles this objection, as well.
25 It is a cost of this view that it ascribes misrepresentation to experience; it’s not clear to
me how large this cost is.
26 This is a plausible point about content in general. Though water-thoughts in fact refer
to something complex – namely, H2O – this need not be introspectively accessible to the
chemically ignorant, who might well believe that water is a simple substance. Still, even such
a chemically ignorant individual may have good introspective access to the contents of her
water-thoughts, since she knows that those thoughts concern water.
27 If one doesn’t think that states of affairs are the relata of causal relations, no matter. The
point can easily be rephrased in terms of events, or properties, or whatever one thinks the
relata of causal relations are.
28 I owe this example to Eric Lormand.
29 Does the object to which this property is ascribed – in this case, the bell pepper – also
figure in the content of the experience? I argue against this in Mehta, ms. B. Even if one
disagrees, this shouldn’t matter, as Jack and Jill are seeing the same object in the Color
Inversion Case.
30 I also think that this kind of subjective representationalist account can easily handle
examples like Ned Block’s Inverted Earth case (1990) and Brad Thompson’s cases involving
spatial inversions (2010), though I don’t have space to discuss such cases here. Such cases
seem deeply problematic for objective representationalism.
31 Those who have trouble coherently conceiving of such a case may instead substitute a
‘shifted experience’ case where Jack’s experience of a sound of n decibels is, in general, just
like Jill’s experience of a sound of 0.8n decibels.
32 The literature on this has grown explosively, but a good starting point is Horgan and
Tienson, 2002.
33 Among anti-transparency theorists, Boghossian and Velleman (1989) and Smith
(2008) focus on blurry-vision and double-vision cases; Peacocke (1983) and Siewert (2004)
emphasize size- and shape-constancy phenomena; and Block (1996) discusses bodily
sensations.
34 See Shoemaker, 1994a, p. 28.
35 Actually, a more natural thing to say is that the proposition contains Chicago itself,
New York itself, and the relation being to the west of. But I am not primarily concerned with
the right way of thinking about belief contents. I develop the view in the text only to draw
certain analogies with the content of experience. That’s also why I don’t talk about Fregean
views of content here. Since I’m not proposing a Fregean account of the content of experi-
ence, the parallels between a Fregean account of ordinary content and a Fregean account of
centered content aren’t relevant here.
36 Following up on my remarks at the end of §1: other ways of analyzing indexicality (e.g.
Kaplanian or Fregean ways) cannot, I think, capture the determinacy of experience, but the
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de se analysis can. This point deserves further discussion, which I hope to provide on another
occasion.
37 I would like to thank Andy Egan, Brad Thompson, Eric Lormand, Todd Ganson, Billy
Dunaway, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on this article.
REFERENCES
Block, N. (1990). ‘Inverted Earth,’ Philosophical Perspectives 4, pp. 53–79.
Block, N. (1996). ‘Mental Paint and Mental Latex,’ Philosophical Issues 7, pp. 19–49.
Boghossian, P. and Velleman, D. (1989). ‘Colour as a Secondary Quality,’ Mind 98, pp.
81–103.
Brogaard, B. (2010). ‘Strong Representationalism and Centered Content,’ Philosophical
Studies 151, pp. 373–392.
Byrne, A. (2001). ‘Intentionalism Defended,’ Philosophical Review 110(2), pp. 199–240.
Byrne, A. (2006). ‘Color and the Mind-Body Problem,’ dialectica 60(3), pp. 223–244.
Byrne, A. (2009). ‘Experience and Content,’ Philosophical Quarterly 59(236), pp. 429–451.
Byrne, A. and Hilbert, D. (2003). ‘Color Realism and Color Science,’ Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 26, pp. 3–64.
Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2005). Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (2006). ‘Perception and the Fall from Eden,’ in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne
(eds) Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. (1999). ‘The Mind’s Awareness of Itself,’ Philosophical Studies 95, pp. 103–124.
Dretske, F. (2003). ‘Experience as Representation,’ Philosophical Issues 13, pp. 67–82.
Egan, A. (2006). ‘Appearance Properties?’ Noûs 40(3), pp. 495–521.
Harman, G. (1990). ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,’ Philosophical Perspectives 4, pp.
31–52.
Harman, G. (2001). ‘General Foundations versus Rational Insight,’ Philosophy and Phenom-
enological Research 63, pp. 657–663.
Hill, C. (2009). Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002). ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenom-
enology of Intentionality,’ in D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Con-
temporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, F. (1982). ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia,’ Philosophical Quarterly 32, pp. 127–136.
Kaplan, D. (1989a). ‘Demonstratives,’ in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds) Themes
from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaplan, D. (1989b). ‘Afterthoughts,’ in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds) Themes
from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levine, J. (1983). ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,’ Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 64, pp. 354–361.
Lewis, D. (1979). ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,’ Philosophical Review 88, pp. 513–543.
Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mehta, N. (forthcoming). ‘Beyond Transparency: The Spatial Argument for Experiential
Externalism,’ Philosophers’ Imprint.
Mehta, N. (unpublished ms. B). ‘The Generality of Experience (and the Particularity of
Perception).’
EXPLORING SUBJECTIVE REPRESENTATIONALISM 593
© 2012 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pautz, A. (2010). ‘A Simple View Of Consciousness,’ in R. Bealer and G. Koons (eds) The
Waning of Materialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. (1979). ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical,’ Noûs 13, pp. 3–21.
Shoemaker, S. (1982). ‘The Inverted Spectrum,’ Journal of Philosophy 79, pp. 357–381.
Shoemaker, S. (1994a). ‘Phenomenal Character,’ Noûs, Vol. 28, pp. 21–38.
Shoemaker, S. (1994b). ‘Self-knowledge and Inner Sense, Lecture III: The Phenomenal
Character of Experience,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(2), pp. 291–314.
Shoemaker, S. (2000). ‘Phenomenal Character Revisited,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 60(2), pp. 465–467.
Shoemaker, S. (2001). ‘Introspection and Phenomenal Character,’ Philosophical Topics 28(2),
pp. 247–273.
Shoemaker, S. (2003). ‘Content, Character, and Color,’ Philosophical Issues 13, pp. 253–278.
Shoemaker, S. (2006). ‘On the Way Things Appear,’ in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds)
Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Siewert, C. (2004). ‘Is Experience Transparent?’ Philosophical Studies 117, pp. 15–41.
Smith, A. D. (2008). ‘Translucent Experiences,’ Philosophical Studies 140, pp. 197–212.
Thompson, B. (2007). ‘Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content,’ Philosophical Studies 135,
pp. 307–334.
Thompson, B. (2009). ‘Senses for Senses,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87, pp. 99–117.
Thompson, B. (2010). ‘The Spatial Content of Experience,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 81, pp. 146–184.
Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal
Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (1996). ‘Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing,’ Philosophical Issues 7,
pp. 117–126.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2002). ‘Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience,’ Noûs 36, pp.
137–151.
Tye, M. (2009). Consciousness Revisited. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY594
© 2012 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
